Disaster Management in Scale-Free Networks: Recovery from and Protection
  Against Intentional Attacks by Rezaei, Behnam A. et al.
ar
X
iv
:c
on
d-
m
at
/0
50
41
85
v3
  [
co
nd
-m
at.
sta
t-m
ec
h]
  1
1 M
ay
 20
05 Disaster Management in Scale-Free Networks: Recovery from and Protection Against
Intentional Attacks
Behnam A. Rezaei,∗ Nima Sarshar,† and Vwani P. Roychowdhury‡
Department of Electrical Engineering
University of California, Los Angeles
P. Oscar Boykin§
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Florida, Gainesville
Susceptibility of scale free Power Law (PL) networks to attacks has been traditionally studied
in the context of what may be termed as instantaneous attacks, where a randomly selected set of
nodes and edges are deleted while the network is kept static. In this paper, we shift the focus to the
study of progressive and instantaneous attacks on reactive grown and random PL networks, which
can respond to attacks and take remedial steps. In the process, we present several techniques that
managed networks can adopt to minimize the damages during attacks, and also to efficiently recover
from the aftermath of successful attacks. For example, we present (i) compensatory dynamics
that minimize the damages inflicted by targeted progressive attacks, such as linear-preferential
deletions of nodes in grown PL networks; the resulting dynamic naturally leads to the emergence of
networks with PL degree distributions with exponential cutoffs; (ii) distributed healing algorithms
that can scale the maximum degree of nodes in a PL network using only local decisions, and (iii)
efficient means of creating giant connected components in a PL network that has been fragmented
by attacks on a large number of high-degree nodes. Such targeted attacks are considered to be a
major vulnerability of PL networks; however, our results show that the introduction of only a small
number of random edges, through a reverse percolation process, can restore connectivity, which in
turn allows restoration of other topological properties of the original network. Thus, the scale-free
nature of the networks can itself be effectively utilized for protection and recovery purposes.
PACS numbers:
Keywords: growing networks, power law, attacks, peer-to-peer(P2P), scale-free, preferential deletion, com-
pensation, ad hoc networks
I. INTRODUCTION
A large number of networks in different contexts have
been found to have scale free structures( see [1] and ref-
erences there in) characterized by Power-Law degree dis-
tributions. For a power-law (PL) degree distribution, the
probability of a randomly chosen node to have degree k
scales as P (k) ∝ k−γ for large k; γ is referred to as the ex-
ponent of the distribution. Moreover, a PL distribution
is considered to be heavy tailed if 2 < γ ≤ 3, i.e., when the
mean is bounded but the variance is unbounded. While
many of these networks have evolved naturally, driven
by dynamical processes over which we do not have much
control, there are several classes of other networks, where
the underlying dynamics can be altered to make sure
that the resulting networks not only have scale-free struc-
tures, but are also resilient to external attacks. Exam-
ples of such designer complex networks include, the In-
ternet, national power grids and other infrastructure re-
lated networks, computer and communication networks,
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and more recently Peer-To-Peer (P2P) networks. With
the economy going more global every year, the emergence
of different kinds of complex networks that interconnect
distributed centers of communication, finance, and man-
ufacturing, will only see a rapid growth. In such net-
works, attacks are a fact of life, and simple attacks, such
as Denial-of-Service (DOS), can cripple hubs and other
nodes, leading to severe disruptions of services. Under-
standing the effect of attacks, and mechanisms to respond
to attacks is thus of great practical importance to many
network based systems.
As reviewed in the following, the study of attacks, in-
cluding both targeted and random, in scale-free PL net-
works have been mostly restricted to the case of instanta-
neous or massive attacks carried out on passive networks.
In this paper, we shift the focus to the study of progres-
sive and rapid attacks on networks that can respond in
an active fashion. In the process, we design several tech-
niques that managed networks can adopt to minimize
the damages, and also to efficiently recover from the af-
termath of successful attacks. We find that the scale-free
nature of the networks can be judiciously utilized for such
protection and recovery purposes.
2A. Instantaneous vs. Progressive Attacks and
Reactive Vs. Non-Reactive Networks
Susceptibility of networks to attacks has been tradi-
tionally studied in the context of what may be termed
as instantaneous attacks, where a randomly selected set
of nodes and edges are deleted while the network is kept
static. Hence, for all purposes, the targeted nodes and
edges are deleted simultaneously. The effect of such in-
stantaneous attacks is then studied in terms of the con-
nectivity structure of the network that is left behind af-
ter the attack, i.e., how many connected components are
there in the compromised network, and if there exist giant
connected components that contain a constant fraction of
the remaining nodes. It is well known, for example, that
in random Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) networks[2] it is sufficient
to remove nodes independently with a probability above
a certain threshold in order to break up the network into
many subnetworks that are all small in size. Thus, ran-
dom ER networks are considered susceptible to random
deletions of nodes, or just instantaneous random attacks
(IRAs). The case where the deleted nodes are picked non-
uniformly randomly (e.g., preferentially with respect to
their degrees) has also been studied; for the purposes of
this paper, such attacks will be termed as Instantaneous
Targeted Attacks (ITAs).
From a network management perspective, a key fea-
ture of such attack models is that the network remains
passive or non-reactive during an attack: the removal of
nodes and edges occurs without allowing the network to
take actions (for example, inserting extra edges or allow-
ing a deleted node to rejoin the network) to minimize
the disruptive effects of the attacks. We shall refer to
such networks as non-reactive networks. On the other
hand, if a networked system takes active compensatory
measures to maintain its integrity during an attack, or if
it takes measures to recover from the damages inflicted
by an instantaneous attack, then we will refer to such
networks as reactive networks. Moreover, an attack that
takes place at rates comparable to the response time of
a network will be referred to as a progressive or gradual
attack (as opposed to instantaneous attacks). In this pa-
per, instead of only studying the case of instantaneous
attacks on non-reactive networks, we explore the cases
of both progressive and instantaneous attacks on reactive
and dynamic networks, and study how the underlying
networks can protect against, and recover from such at-
tacks.
B. Instantaneous Attacks on Random and Grown
Scale-Free PL Networks
Both IRAs and ITAs have been studied using the con-
cept of percolation theory. Consider a network of size N
in which the largest connected component comprises a
fraction λ of the nodes. The site percolation process pro-
ceeds as follows: Take a constant probability 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
(i.e., independent of the size parameter N) called the
percolation probability. Delete each node in the network
independently with probability 1 − p and retain it with
probability p. For large N , the resulting network will
have almost pN nodes. Out of these pN nodes, a set of
S(N, p) nodes will form a single connected component of
the largest size. The main lesson of percolation theory
is that for many families of graphs there exists a pc > 0,
such that if p > pc then lim
N→∞
S(N, p)
Np
= λ′(p) > 0, and if
p < pc, then lim
N→∞
S(N, p)
Np
= 0. The critical percolation
probability, pc, is called the percolation threshold. This
uniform instant site percolation process is a particular
case of IRAs introduced earlier.
One can generalize the above-mentioned percolation
concept of picking nodes randomly but uniformly, to
where the nodes to be deleted are picked randomly, but
with a distribution based on their degrees. For example,
the case of targeted instant site percolation process (or
ITA’s) might consist of (i) deleting all nodes of degree
greater than a pre-specified value of say k0, or (ii) if the
fraction of nodes with degree k in the original network is
pk, then the fraction of nodes of degree k after the attack
is reduced to p′k = bk
−qpk, where b is a normalization
constant. In both cases, the high-degree nodes are the
targets of severe attacks, and the low degree nodes are
mostly left alone.
The percolation properties of random heavy-tailed
scale-free Power-Law networks have been studied
extensively[3, 4, 5] and provide a mixed message when
it comes to their vulnerabilities to IRAs and ITAs. For
IRAs, the percolation theory reveals a very promising
fact: The percolation threshold of these graphs is zero.
That is, no matter how small the percolation probability,
p, is, the remaining nodes in the percolated network has a
giant connected component. Thus, random PL networks
can withstand IRAs with arbitrarily high rates. Previous
studies, however, have also shown that the random PL
networks are more vulnerable to ITAs, e.g., removal of a
large number of only high degree nodes from scale-free
networks is enough to fragment the network such that a
giant connected component does not exist[3, 6, 7]. Thus,
by removing a constant fraction of all nodes preferen-
tially, one can destroy the connectivity of the network;
note that the attacker still has to remove almost all the
high-degree nodes to do so, which might be a difficult task
to accomplish [6].
In many situations, however, the scale-free PL net-
works are not truly random, but can be modelled as be-
ing grown by dynamical rules, where nodes and edges are
added at certain rates. Such networks will be referred to
in this paper as grown scale-free networks. For exam-
ple, the simple preferential attachment dynamic and its
variants can give rise to scale-free grown networks with
several tunable topological characteristics. Unlike the
case of the random scale-free networks, currently there
is no instantaneous percolation theory for these grown
3scale-free networks. Nevertheless, empirical studies sug-
gest that these networks are also both resilient to ran-
dom deletions of their nodes (IRAs), and vulnerable to
targeted attacks just as in the case of random scale-free
networks [8].
For both random and grown PL networks, while we
know that they are vulnerable to severe ITAs, the issue
of how to recover from such attacks and glue the frag-
mented network back together efficiently has not been
addressed. We show in Section IV how the PL structure
of the network can in fact be an asset in this recovery
process.
C. Progressive Attacks and Grown Scale-Free
Networks
Recall that in progressive or gradual attacks, the dele-
tions of nodes and edges take place at rates comparable
to those at which the dynamics of the grown network it-
self operates at. For example, a progressive attack might
correspond to a scenario, where randomly chosen existing
nodes in the network (picked preferentially or uniformly
with respect to the degree of a node) are removed at the
same rate at which the new nodes join in. What do such
progressive attacks do to the grown networks as opposed
to the well studied case of instantaneous attacks?
Consider the simple case of linearly preferentially
grown network [9], where in addition to a node joining the
network at each time step, a uniformly randomly chosen
existing node in the network is deleted with probability
c at each step. Such a dynamic is considered in detail
in [10, 11]. It turns out that unlike the instantaneous
attack case, where a grown network is resistant to IRAs,
a grown network is very vulnerable to random progres-
sive attacks. However, the connectivity structure of
the attacked network is no longer a relevant mea-
sure to study the effect or severity of the progressive
attacks; the network almost always remains connected,
or has a giant connected component. As shown in [12],
the damage to the network manifests itself by forcing the
network to rapidly lose its heavy-tailed distribution (i.e.,
the PL exponent becomes much grater than 3, even as c
increases only marginally), and the resulting grown net-
work starts resembling networks with exponential degree
distributions under the attack.
A reactive grown network, however, may take remedial
actions, and one might ask if there exist compensatory
dynamics that will restore the heavy-tailed distribution
even in the presence of the random progressive attack. It
was shown in [12] that indeed the linear-preferential at-
tachment dynamics can be modified in a very simple and
local fashion to preserve the heavy-tailed degree distribu-
tion and the scale-free nature of the grown network. The
compensatory procedure is intuitive and greedy: when-
ever a node loses a connection, which can only happen
when a neighboring node is deleted due to the progressive
attack, it compensates for it by making a new preferen-
tial connection with a certain probability n. Thus, the
dynamics remain strictly local (each node reacts only if it
is directly impacted by the attack dynamic) and yet, the
end result is that the damages to the global topological
properties of the network are repaired, even in the limit
of extremely high deletion rates (i.e., c→ 1).
This particular case study brings out two important
differences between instantaneous and progressive at-
tacks: (i) While a grown network might be resistant to
IRAs, it can be extremely vulnerable to progressive ran-
dom attacks. The damage to the network is no longer
in terms of a loss in connectivity, but rather in terms
of other topological properties of the network. (ii) It
is, however, possible to make the dynamical rules of the
grown networks to be reactive, and generate networks
that are extremely resistant to both gradual and instan-
taneous random failures and attacks.
D. Protecting Against and Recovering from
Attacks in Reactive Scale-Free Networks: A
Summary of Results
We first consider protection against progressive or grad-
ual targeted attacks in grown networks. The need to ad-
dress this type of intentional attacks is particularly urgent
in designer complex networks, such as the P2P networks,
where performing a comprehensive large-scale attack on
all the high-degree nodes is an expensive, and often, a
very difficult task. However, gradual deletions of high-
degree nodes by first crawling the network and identify-
ing the high-degree nodes that serve as conduits for com-
munication among low-degree nodes, and then attacking
some of these nodes might be quite feasible.
Clearly, if no precaution or compensatory action is
taken against such an attack, then as exemplified in the
case of progressive random attacks[12], one would lose
key topological features, including a loss of its heavy
tailed degree distribution. How to equip the network
with proper feed-back strategies to mitigate the damag-
ing effects of the attacks and failures? These feedback
strategies, moreover, must obey some stringent criteria:
They must be local, in the sense that they should be
triggered and adjusted only based on first neighbor infor-
mation. In Section II we introduce one such dynamical
compensatory algorithm to mitigate the effect of linear-
preferential attacks. In particular we show that, only
with simple local modifications to the dynamics, the net-
work can restore much (but not all) of its heavy-tail. The
resulting degree distribution is shown to be a power-law
with an exponential cutoff at a point that is inversely pro-
portional to the rate of the targeted attack. Again, there
is always a giant connected component, and the main
effect of the attack is to introduce an exponential cut-
off, and lower the PL exponent marginally. Thus, while
the attacked network does lose its unbounded variance,
the compensatory dynamics manage to preserve the over-
all PL degree distribution, and as shown next, keep the
4network in a state, from which it can recover in a local
fashion.
We next show in Section III A that a preferentially at-
tacked network can perform large-scale network repairing
and maintenance operations and selectively add edges,
so as to increase the kmax by any desired scaling fac-
tor; thus, this can repair the cutoff problem resulting
from linear-preferential attacks. The recovery procedure
is local, in the sense that each node independently de-
cides how many preferential connections to create, and
no global coordination is necessary. This procedure re-
tains the exponent of the PL distribution, and only in-
creases the maximum-degree of the distribution, so that
the exponential cut-off point is not a limiting factor.
Next, we consider the case of recovery from a large-
scale targeted attack. A heavy enough and instantaneous
targeted attack will finally fragment any static or dy-
namic network. In Section IV we for the first time con-
sider the challenging problem of repairing a complex net-
work fragmented by targeted attacks. The disaster re-
covery consists of two distinct phases, and the first is to
recover the lost connectivity. We show that with only a
few essential communication paths one can create a giant
connected component and glue the network fragments.
In particular, we first show (both analytically and nu-
merically) that when scale-free networks are fragmented
due to targeted attacks, it results in small-size connected
components, the size distribution of which is again heavy-
tailed. This allows us to prove that the connectivity of
the whole fragmented network can be restored with only
a few successful random connections, via the process of
reverse percolation. Thus, the nodes of the network will
be able to communicate to each other to transfer vital
”low-rate” messages, as long as a few random connec-
tions among the nodes can be established. Recovery of
the topology, can then be achieved, once connectivity is
established. Such a recovery step could consist of apply-
ing one of the many dynamical rules [1, 9, 12] that would
allow it to regain its scale-free structure.
II. REACTIVE GROWN NETWORKS IN
PRESENCE OF LINEAR-PREFERENTIAL
ATTACKS AND COMPENSATION
This section considers a progressive attack, where at
each time step in addition to a node joining the net-
work, a preferentially chosen node is deleted with prob-
ability r. Nodes that loose neighbors to attack don’t
sit still, instead they react and replace those lost neigh-
bors; moreover the attacked nodes rejoin the network as
new nodes. We show that such a compensatory dynamic
in the presence of linear-preferential progressive attacks
naturally leads to a PL degree distribution with an expo-
nential cutoff, where the cut-off depends on the prefer-
ential deletion rate. Thus, while the attack bounds the
maximum degree of the distribution, the compensatory
protocol is able to preserve the exponent of the PL distri-
bution. Moreover, as shown in our simulations, as long
as each incoming node makes m ≥ 2 random preferential
connections, there always exists a giant connected com-
ponent, even for very high rates of preferential attacks
(see Fig. 1 for an example); thus the loss of connectiv-
ity is not one of the damaging effects of such progressive
attacks.
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FIG. 1: The fraction of nodes in the largest connected com-
ponent for various rates of targeted attack when m = 4. Even
for rates as high as 30%, more than 97% of the nodes belong
to a single component.
Our model is a time dynamic one. At each step:
1. A new node s is added to the network and makes
m preferential attachments.
2. With probability r a preferentially selected node w
is chosen. The preferential selection procedure se-
lects the node w with degree k(w, t) with probabil-
ity k(w, t)/
∑
i k(i, t). The selected node w is then
deleted from the network, were deletion process is:
• Delete node w and all its edges. Then w starts
as a new node and makes m preferential at-
tachments.
• For all nodes z that were connected to w and
have lost an edge, each one compensates by
adding an edge preferentially.
A. Analysis
We adopt the same rate equation approach as [12, 13]
for our analysis. Label each node with its insertion time
to network, i. Define degree of ith node at time t as
k(i, t). When a node is deleted its joining time is reset.
Let S(t) =
∑
i k(i, t) = 2E(t) = 2(m + r)t and total
number of nodes at time t, N(t) = t. The mean degree
is 〈k〉 = 2(m+ r). We want to find P (k), i.e. probability
that a randomly chosen node has degree k at steady state
(t→∞). We also define f(t) as average number of edges
deleted at time t when a node is deleted preferentially,
5that is the average degree of a node chosen preferentially:
f(t) = 〈k(i,t)
2〉
〈k〉 . Note that obviously 〈k〉 ≤ f(t) ≤ E(t).
Define the probability that ith node is not deleted before
time t (is still in the network) as D(i, t). The initial
conditions are D(i, i) = 1, and k(i, i) = m. Next we
write master equations for k(i, t) and D(i, t)
∂k(i, t)
∂t
= m
k(i, t)
S(t)
+ rm
k(i, t)
S(t)
+ rf(t)
k(i, t)
S(t)
(1)
where the first term corresponds to m preferential at-
tachments, the second term corresponds to deleted node
rejoining the network, and the last term represents pref-
erential compensation of on average rf(t) edges. Note
that since each node compensates for lost edges there is
no negative term in the equation. Also at time t+ 1 the
probability that ith node still exist in the network is given
by:
D(i, t+ 1) = D(i, t)
(
1− r
k(i, t)
S(t)
)
D(i, t+ 1)−D(i, t) = −rD(i, t)
k(i, t)
S(t)
∂D(i, t)
∂t
= −rD(i, t)
k(i, t)
S(t)
ln
D(i, s)
D(i, i)
= −
∫ s
i
rk(i, t)
2(m+ r)t
dt
= −
r
〈k〉
∫ s
i
k(i, t)
t
dt
D(i, s) = exp
(
−
r
〈k〉
∫ s
i
k(i, t)
t
dt
)
(2)
Define k˜(i, s) =
∫ s
i
k(i,t)
t dt, then D(i, s) =
exp(−rk˜(i, s)/〈k〉). Note if k(i, t) is lower bounded by
Ctβ then k˜(i, t) ≥ 1β k(i, t):
k(i, t) ≥ Ctβ
k˜(i, t) ≥
k(i, t)
β
(3)
In order to solve for k(i, t), we need to know f(t), which
depends on k(i, t):
f(t) =
〈k2〉
〈k〉
=
1
N(t)〈k〉
t∑
i=0
k(i, t)2D(i, t) (4)
When Equation 3 is valid then:
f(t) =
1
N(t)〈k〉
t∑
i=0
k(i, t)2D(i, t)
=
1
t〈k〉
t∑
i=0
k(i, t)2 exp
(
−
r
〈k〉
k˜(i, t)
)
≤
1
t〈k〉
t∑
i=0
k(i, t)2 exp
(
−
r
β〈k〉
k(i, t)
)
Since x2 exp(−αx) ≤ 4e
−2
α2 :
f(t) ≤
1
t〈k〉
t∑
i=0
(β〈k〉)2
r2
4e−2
=
4e−2β2〈k〉
r2
(5)
Thus we see that if k(i, t) is a finite polynomial of positive
powers of t, then f(t) is a constant.
We know that f(t) ≤ E(t) = (m+ r)t, but edge dele-
tion may reduce it further. Hence we consider the case
where f(t) = atb. We consider this for two cases, first
where b = 0, and second where b > 0. If f(t) = a then
Eqn. 1 becomes
∂k(i, t)
∂t
= (m(1 + r) + ra)
k(i, t)
S(t)
= (m+ r + r(m + a− 1))
k(i, t)
2(m+ r)t
=
(
1
2
+
r(m + a− 1)
2(m+ r)
)
k(i, t)
t
so, using ǫ ≡ r(m+a−1)2(m+r)
∂k(i, t)
k(i, t)
=
(
1
2
+ ǫ
)
1/t
ln
k(i, t)
k(i, i)
=
(
1
2
+ ǫ
)
ln(t/i)
k(i, t) = m
(
t
i
) 1
2
+ǫ
(6)
Eqn. 5 already showed that if k(i, t) grows as a power of t,
f(t) is constant. The above shows that when we assume
that f(t) = a, we see that k(i, t) grows as a power of t/i.
We calculate P (k, t) from k(i, t) and D(i, t) using Eqn.
2:
D(i, s) = exp
(
−
r
〈k〉
∫ s
i
k(i, t)
t
dt
)
= exp
(
−
r
〈k〉
∫ s
i
m
(
t
i
)1/2+ǫ
1
t
dt
)
= exp
(
−
rm
i
1
2
+ǫ〈k〉
∫ s
i
tǫ−
1
2 dt
)
= exp
(
−
r
(12 + ǫ)〈k〉
(k(i, t)−m)
)
P (k, t) =
1
N(t)
.Σi:k(i,t)=kD(i, t)
=
1
t
D(i, t)|
∂i
∂k
| (7)
6If k(i, t) = m(t/i)1/2+ǫ:
k(i, t) = m(t/i)
1
2
+ǫ
(k(i, t)/m)
2
1+2ǫ = t/i
i = t
(
k
m
) −2
1+2ǫ
∂i
∂k
= t
2
1 + 2ǫ
(
k
m
)−3−2ǫ
1+2ǫ
Thus:
P (k, t) =
1
t
D(i, t)|
∂i
∂k
|
=
1
t
exp
(
−
r
(12 + ǫ)〈k〉
(k −m)
)
t
2
1 + 2ǫ
(
k
m
)−3−2ǫ
1+2ǫ
= exp
(
−
r
(12 + ǫ)〈k〉
(k −m)
)
2
1 + 2ǫ
(
k
m
)−3−2ǫ
1+2ǫ
So, when we assume that f(t) = a, or that 〈k2〉 = a〈k〉,
we see that we get a power-law degree distribution with
an exponential cut-off at kc = 〈k〉(
1
2 + ǫ)/r = (m/r +
1)(1 + 2ǫ). As r → 0, kc →∞, as expected.
Now we consider the case of f(t) = atb with b > 0:
∂k(i, t)
∂t
=
(
m(1 + r) + ratb
) k(i, t)
S(t)
=
(
m+ r + r(m− 1)
2(m+ r)
1
t
+
ra
2(m+ r)
tb−1
)
k(i, t)
ln
k(i, t)
k(i, i)
=
(
m+ r + r(m− 1)
2(m+ r)
ln t+
ra
2(m+ r)
tb
b
)
ln
k(i, t)
m
=
(
1
2
+ β
)
ln(t/i) + γ
tb − ib
b
k(i, t) = m
(
t
i
) 1
2
+β
exp
(γ
b
(tb − ib)
)
≥ m
(
t
i
) 1
2
+β
with β = r(m−1)2(m+r) and γ =
ra
2(m+r) . We see that even if
we assume that f(t) = atb, then we find that k(i, t) ≥
m(t/i)1/2+β , but then according to Eqn. 5, f(t) is upper
bounded by a constant, which implies that k(i, t) only
grows as a power of t as we saw in Eqn. 6.
This result clearly shows that preferential deletion of
nodes will impose an exponential cut-off on power-law
degree distribution of the growing networks thus remov-
ing high degree tail of the network which are essential for
its functionality [14].
B. Simulations
We have performed extensive Monte Carlo simulations.
We grow the network where at each step a node is added
and makes m = 2 preferential attachments. Then with
probability r we delete a node, choosing a node to be
deleted preferentially. Fig. 2 shows the effect of low rate
preferential deletion as imposing an exponential cutoff on
the scale-free degree distribution.
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FIG. 2: The CCDF of the degree distribution for various
preferential node deletion probabilities for a network of size
50,000 and m = 2.
III. DECENTRALIZED AND DISTRIBUTED
HEALING OF SHARP CUTOFFS IN PL
NETWORKS
We consider a connected PL network where the tail
(i.e., the set of high degree nodes) is removed. We first
show how a local compensation process, involving the cre-
ation of new links, can restore the maximum degree to
a multiple of the existing cutoff. Each node decides ran-
domly and independently how many preferential edges
to insert, and thus the healing process does not need any
central coordination mechanism. Such a healing process
can be periodically applied by, for example, a network
created by the dynamics described in the previous sec-
tion, where a cutoff in the degree distribution is naturally
introduced.
A. Healing Process
Consider a short tailed power-law network of exponent
α and maximum degree k0. The objective of the healing
process is to increase the maximum degree of the dis-
tribution by a stretch-factor w = kmax/k0, so that the
maximum degree after the healing process will increase
from k0 to kmax, while the power-law exponent remains
the same.
7Healing Algorithm Given a PL network with expo-
nent α, each node i independently decides to compen-
sate with some probability p. The compensation process
involves making (w − 1)ki new preferential connections
where ki is the degree of the i
th node.
Let P (k) and P ′(k) be the degree distributions before
and after the healing process respectively, then one can
easily show that given P (k) is a short tailed power-law
with maximum degree k0 and p ≈ w
−α, P ′(k) follows a
power law distribution as λ(w,α)k−α. Where λ is a con-
stant depending on w and α and cut off is increased to
kmax. In other words, the effect of the healing process is
simply to stretch the degree distribution by a linear fac-
tor. Now since the degree distribution is scale-free to
begin with, such stretching will not change the distribu-
tion. Thus power-law degree distribution of the original
network is the key for the simple healing process to suc-
ceed.
B. Autonomous Healing
So far we have considered a static case, i.e., we are
given a network with a sharp cutoff, and the nodes ran-
domly decide to introduce new edges to restore the cutoff
to a desired value, kmax, while retaining the same PL ex-
ponent, α, as before. One can modify this static scenario
to an adaptive version, where instead of all the nodes act-
ing at once, each node reacts whenever it loses an edge
unannounced, i.e., due to an attacked node going down.
The idea is to naturally detect a heavy attack and initi-
ate the healing process.
Feedback Algorithm: Each node i when losing an edge
without prior notice performs the healing algorithm of
Section IIIA with probability 1/ki, where ki is the de-
gree of the ith node.
Clearly any targeted deletion of nodes in the tail of the
degree distribution, i.e., high degree nodes, will result in
the deletion of a constant fraction of the edges of the
system. If we further neglect the degree correlation of
the nodes, the probability of any edge being deleted when
nodes of degree greater than k0 are deleted will be given
by:
p˜ ≈
Σkmaxk0 kP (k)
E
= λk2−α0 . (8)
for some constant λ in the order of 1. Then, the proba-
bility of a node with degree k losing an edge is P̂k ≈ kp˜.
Thus the probability of a node initiating the healing pro-
cess is approximately P̂k/k = p˜, a constant depending on
only the intensity of the attack; We must re-state that
we have not considered second order effects and degree
correlations here. This algorithm is basically intended to
detect any large scale instantaneous deletion of a frac-
tion of network edges. Thus, the algorithm ensures that
a constant fraction of the nodes will always perform the
healing algorithm in the case of a large enough attack.
We have performed the Monte Carlo simulations of the
healing and feedback algorithm. Fig. 3 shows how the
healing algorithm works for different values of α.
IV. RESTORING CONNECTIVITY IN A
FRAGMENTED POWER-LAW NETWORK
Any network will breakdown under a sufficiently heavy
targeted attack, and the question we ask is how many
random connections among the nodes in the fragmented
network do we need to establish before a giant connected
component emerges. The goal of this section is to show
that both grown and random power-law networks, are
very amenable to quick bootstrapping from an attack,
and with almost no global coordination. In particular, we
will show that even under very intense attacks, only an
infinitesimally small probability of success for new con-
nections is enough to quickly reconnect most of the bro-
ken network.
For example, consider a linearly preferentially grown
PL network of size 50, 000 and average degree 4, that
has undergone a very heavy targeted attack in which all
nodes of degree more than 50 are lost. For a particular
simulation, the size of the largest component was only
371 after the attack. Now assume that all the nodes try
to initiate only one random connection to some other
node in the network in a hope to restore the connectiv-
ity. If the probability of success of each of these attempts
is only 5%, our simulations show that a very large com-
ponent of size more than 20,000 forms. This probability
of success will go asymptotically to zero as the network
size increases. Of course, other reconstruction algorithms
will be required to repair the topological damages to the
network, as was the subject of the algorithms in Section
IIIA.
The results in this section will follow the following
pattern: First we will argue that grown PL networks
fragmented under a targeted attack, have components
whose size distributions are heavy-tailed PL’s. Thus,
even though the average size of the connected compo-
nents is bounded, the variance is unbounded (or very
large). While a proof for grown networks is difficult in
general, we show analytically that for a linearly prefer-
entially grown tree network (i.e., each node joining the
network makes exactly one preferential connection) the
removal of the highest degree node indeed creates discon-
nected components with a PL size distribution. We then
show, using the generating functions formalism, that the
same phenomenon can be observed in random PL net-
works for special forms of targeted attacks.
Next, we prove that as long as we have components
with heavy-tailed size distribution, then only a vanish-
ingly small number of random connections will glue the
fragments together into a giant connected component.
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FIG. 3: Degree distribution before and after healing for vari-
ous values of power-law exponent α and stretch factors w.
A. Distribution of the size of components after
attack: Grown Power-law graphs
Generally, instantaneous percolation (and hence at-
tack) on grown graphs is hard to analyze. For some
special cases however, the statistics of the connected
components after a preferential attack can be tracked.
In this subsection, we compute the distribution of the
sizes of the connected components for graphs grown un-
der the preferential attachment (Barabasi-Albert graphs)
with m = 1: At each time step, a new node is added
to the network and initiates one preferentially targeted
link. The probability that the ith node receives this link
is k(i, t)/
∑t
j=1 k(j, t), where k(i, t) is the degree of the
ith node at time t.
At some time t ≫ 1, a preferential attack occurs, and
deletes the oldest node i = 1. As a result of such at-
tack, the network will be fragmented into many con-
nected components. We now show that the size of these
components have a power-law distribution, and in partic-
ular, the probability that a randomly chosen component
has size C is ∝ C−3/2.
Before continuing, we need the following observations:
(i) Since m = 1, the network topology is a tree. (ii)
Take any node i and consider the subtree rooted at i and
consisting of all the nodes younger than i. The size of this
subtree, denoted by T (i, t) can be calculated as follows:
At time t = i, this subtree has had only one node (with
one link to some other node j < i), thus T (i, i) = 1, while
there has been i other links in the network. The rate of
change of T (i, t) can be written as:
∂T (i, t)
∂t
=
(2T (i, t)− 1)
2t
If 1 can be neglected compare to 2T (i, t) (which is cer-
tainly true when t≫ i), one gets: T (i, t) = (t/i).
Now, note that from the rate-equations, the degree of
a node inserted at time i, at a later time t is given by :
k(i, t) = (t/i)β for β = 1/2. Thus the degree of the first
node is around k(1, t) = t1/2. Thus, once the first node
is deleted, exactly k(1, t) connected components will be
created (remember the network is tree). Lets enumer-
ate these components by the sets C1, C2, ..., Ck(1,t). Let
κj , j = 1, 2, ..., k(1, t) be the oldest node in each Cj . By
construction of the network, the node κj must have been
connected to the first node (i = 1). Now note that the
size of the subtree Cj is simply |Cj | = T (κj , t) = (t/κj).
This will allow us to find the probability that a randomly
chosen connected component has size C as follows:
PC =
#Components of size C
k(1, t)
∝
(
Pr{κ connected to 1}
k(1, t)
× |
∂κ
∂C
|
)
κ∗:T (κ∗,t)=C
∝
(κ∗)β
κ∗
× |
∂κ
∂C
|κ∗:T (κ∗,t)=C
9Now, note that T (κ∗, t) = (t/κ∗) = C, and |∂κ/∂C| =
tC−2. Therefore:
PC ∝
C−β
C−1
× C−2 = C−3/2
In [15], Newman et. al, have shown that for any static
random graph, the distribution of the size of the compo-
nents just before the phase transition and the appearance
of a giant connected component obeys the same scaling
law as PC ∝ C
−3/2. So interestingly, while the deletion
of a key node (the first node) fragments the network into
many components (around t1/2 different pieces), the dis-
tribution of the sizes of these components obeys a power-
law.
For more complex randomly grown graphs, no theory
of percolation currently exists to obtain the distribution
of the connected components. Simulations however in-
dicate that the same observations still hold for many
such networks. One such simulation is reported for net-
works grown with the deletion compensation protocol in-
troduced in [12], and is reported in Fig. 4.
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FIG. 4: The distribution of the size of the connected com-
ponents for heavily attacked networks of size 50,000 after a
targeted attack that deleted all the nodes with degree greater
than 50. (top) Linearly preferentially grown PL network
(Barabasi-Albert model) when the average degree is 4. (bot-
tom) Deletion-compensation networks of [12], with γ ≈ 2.3
and average degree 6.
B. Distribution of the size of components after
attack: Static Power-law graphs
We now show that the same observations hold for some
form of random targeted attacks on static power-law net-
works as well. The size distribution of the connected
components of any static random network on a given
degree distribution can be found analytically using the
generating functions formalism [15]. In particular, the
variance of the distribution of the size of these compo-
nents are derived analytically in Appendix A, which also
contains a brief introduction to generating functions for-
malism.
Consider the generating functions of an attacked net-
work:
G0(x) =
K∑
i=1
qkpkx
−k (9)
G1(x) =
G′0(x)
G′0(1)
(10)
(11)
where qk is the probability that a node with degree k is
deleted through the attack. This would define a form of
targeted attack if qk decreases with k. In particular, we
examine a targeted attack for which qk = bk
−q where q
is a measure of the how targeted the attack is and b is a
normalization constant. Then, the generating functions
of the attacked network for an original power-law graph
with exponent τ are:
G0(x) =
K∑
i=1
c1k
−τ−qx−k (12)
(13)
G′1(1) = c
′
K∑
k=1
k−τ−q+2 = O(K−τ−q+3) (14)
for some positive constants c, c′ when τ + q ≥ 2. In
particular, for the linear targeted attack , q = 1, this
value is always finite for any τ > 2.
It should be noted that such preferential attack would
in effect increase the value of τ by an amount of q. Thus
following the approach of Aiello et. al. [16], one can
show that no giant connected component will exist when:
τ + q > βc ≈ 3.478.
Although the network might not have any giant con-
nected component, the variance of the distribution of the
sizes might still diverge. This is shown through G′′1 (1)
(see Eqn. A4):
G′′1 (1) =
K∑
k=3
k(k − 1)(k − 2)bk−τ−q ∝ K−τ−q+4
which diverges for any q provided that q < 4 − τ . In
particular for the linearly targeted attack, q = 1, the
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variance of the size of connected components diverges if
2 < τ < 3, even though the average component size is
finite at least when τ > 2.349.
C. The Reverse Percolation Process
The main idea behind the results in this section is what
we will refer to as the reverse percolation process: Con-
sider an attacked network, as in Fig. 5. Now lets start
adding random edges between the nodes of this network
of many small components. As the number of such ran-
dom links increases, different components of the network
will start to glue together until a giant connected com-
ponent occurs which contains most of the nodes of the
network. Lets call Q(k) the distribution of the sizes of
these small components, that is, Q(k) is the fraction of
these components that have size k. We claim that the re-
verse percolation process corresponds to a percolation on
a random graph with degree distribution P (k) ≡ Q(k).
To see this we need to recall the method with which a
random graph with a prescribed degree distribution P (k)
is built on N nodes [17] (see Fig. 5).
To construct a random graph with degree distribution
P (k), one can proceed as follows [18]: for any k, there
will be NP (k) nodes of degree k in the network, labelled
as V k1 , V
2
k , ..., V
k
NP (k). For each of these nodes create k
dummy duplicate nodes. To be specific, call the dupli-
cates of the i′th node as V ki,1, V
k
i,2, ..., V
k
i,k. Now on this
hyper graph, one can start a random matching. After
the matching, one will collapse the duplicates of a node
i into one node, and therefore all the links to the du-
plicates will now be links to the collapsed node itself.
A reverse percolation process with probability p can be
interpreted as introducing random edges, i.e., doing the
random matching with a fraction p of all the links in the
hyper graph.
With this construction in mind, the validity of our
claim is readily understood. In the connectivity restora-
tion process, any connected component can be viewed as
the duplicate nodes of a single node, and the insertion of
random edges can be viewed as a (reverse) percolation
process on a graph whose degree distribution is equal to
the distribution of the component sizes of the real bro-
ken graph (see Fig. 6). In the usual percolation process,
you keep each edge with probability p, which in the ran-
dom graph construction process, basically involves doing
random matching with probability p, in the network with
duplicated nodes. With this correspondence, many of the
well known results for the percolation process on random
graphs with a given degree distribution can be readily
applied to the gluing process.
In particular, the percolation threshold, correspond-
ing to the probability of successful attempts required
for a giant component to appear can be calculated as:
qc =
〈C〉
〈C2〉−〈C〉2 where 〈C〉, 〈C
2〉 are the average and vari-
ance of the distribution of the connected components (see
for instance for [3]). While the average size of the con-
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FIG. 5: Constructing a random graph on degree distribution,
n1 = 2, n2 = 2, n3 = 2, n4 = 0, n5 = 0, n6 = 1. For any node
of degree i, i dummy copies are created. Then a random
matching is performed on this hyper graph. All the dummy
nodes corresponding to one real node, are then collapsed into
one nodes, to form the actual graph.
nected components in a heavily attacked network is fi-
nite, it is possible for the variance of this distribution to
be very large. In which case, the corresponding percola-
tion threshold will be small. In other words, one would
only require an infinitesimally small fraction of random
links to glue most of the disjoint components together. In
particular, if the distribution of the size of the connected
components follows a power-law distribution with expo-
nent 2 < α < 3 and maximum component size Cmax ≫ 1,
then only O(Cα−3max) successful random links per compo-
nent is enough to ensure that most of the disconnected
components are reconnected.
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FIG. 6: Percolation and Reverse Percolation Process: Bond
percolation corresponds to random deletion of the links of a
network. In the top figure, 4 out of 10 links of the random
network generated in Fig. 5, are deleted, resulting in the
middle graph. This was equivalent to doing the random graph
matching on the hyper graph with only 10-4=6 links instead
of 10 links (the bottom figure).
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have addressed the issue of attack management in
scale-free PL networks that are reactive, and can take
local steps to combat attacks. In particular, we have
shown how grown networks can cope with both random
and linear-preferential progressive attacks, where nodes
are deleted as the network grows. We also presented a
number of recovery schemes, including repairing of sharp
cutoffs in PL degree distributions, and restoration of con-
nectivity in networks fragmented by large-scale targeted
attacks. All these compensatory mechanisms are shown
to be local, in the sense that global coordination among
the nodes is not required, and the nodes initiate new
edges only in reaction to changes in their immediate en-
vironment.
There are several interesting implications of the results
presented in this paper in terms of complex network the-
ory as well. For example, Section II presents a network
dynamic that leads to the emergence of PL degree distri-
butions with exponential cutoffs; perhaps, such a mech-
anism can model existing networks where such degree
distributions have been observed empirically. Similarly,
when one studies the distribution of the size of the con-
nected components in the networks generated by the dy-
namic in Section II, then one observes that there is always
a giant connected component, but more interestingly, the
rest of the components have a power-law size distribution.
Such a component size distribution has been observed, for
example, in the world wide web (WWW) network, and
one wonders if a low-grade preferential deletion of high-
degree nodes in the web is one of the dynamical forces
shaping the underlying connectivity structure.
APPENDIX A: VARIANCE OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE SIZE OF CONNECTED
COMPONENTS IN STATIC RANDOM
NETWORKS
Consider a random network on a given degree distri-
bution P (k) [15], that is the probability that a randomly
chosen node has degree k is , P (k). Define
G0(x) =
K∑
i=1
P (k)x−k
G1(x) =
G′0(x)
G′0(1)
as the generating functions of the degree of a node arrived
at by choosing a random node or link respectively.
Similarly, one can define H1(x), H0(x) as the gener-
ating function of the size of the connected components
arrived at by following a random link and node respec-
tively.
When a giant connected component does not exist
and therefore the graph is tree like, these four functions
should be related through the following consistency equa-
tion:
H1(x) = xG1(H1(x)) (A1)
H0(x) = xG0(H1(x)) (A2)
The average distribution of the sizes of the connected
components are:
〈s〉 = H ′1(1) = 1 +
G′1(1)
1−G′1(1)
The phase transition happens when G′1(1) = 1 and a
giant connected component appears (or disappears).
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The known literature has always been interested in the
average size of the connected components due to its phase
transition and physically measurable properties. We will
however examine the properties of the second moment of
the distribution of the size of the connected components.
Twice differentiating H1(x) in (A1):
H ′′1 (x) = G
′
1(H1(x))H
′
1(x) +H
′
1(x)G
′
1(H1(x)) (A3)
+ xH ′′1G
′
1(H1(x)) + x(H
′
1(x))
2G′′1 (H1(x))
Once differentiating H1(x) in (A1) results in:
H ′1(1) =
2
1−G′1(1)
Plugging this into (A3) evaluated at x = 1 will result in:
E{size2} = H ′′1 (1) =
4G′1(1)
(1−G′1(1))
2
+
4G′′1(1)
(1−G′1(1))
3
(A4)
This second moment can diverge in two cases. First, if
G′1(1) → 1, and second G
′′
1 (1)→ ∞. When a giant con-
nected component does not exist, G′1(1) < 1, the second
moment can still diverge provided that G′′1 (1) diverges.
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